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Abstract
The paper utilizes Stevan Harrell’s concept of civilization projects, especially two
of them: Confucian and Communist ones, which both rank various ethnic groups of
people according to different scales but with similar outcome, i.e. placing the Han
majority at the top of the scale. They also appoint the ruling elites and entrust them the
control of both the society and the important political discourse. Analysis of the
minority-majority discourse, shows that the minorities are still treated as peripheral and
exotic people, undeveloped and in the nedd of being taken care for. The possible
change of the discourse from Marxist to more Confucian terms, following a general
“re-Confucianization of China” is unlikely to bring many changes to the situation of
the minorities, because they will be still refused the right to openly shape the course of
such discourse. Hence their political options will remain also limited to the confines
decreed by the Han-dominated state.
1. Civilization projects
What is the essence of the “civilization project?” Harrell (1995) uses the term to
describe a specific relation between two (or more) groups of people, in which one has
both the ability and the (perceived) right to dominate and transform the other one(s).
Basically it is the relation between a cultural/civilization centre or core and its
peripheries. The core is ranked higher, in terms of civilizational advancement, which
usually encompasses both the material and the intellectual or spiritual level. Scaling is
essential to the civilization project. Peripheries are only “peripheral” in relation to the
centre. They do not have to regard themselves as “peripheral” and do not have to be –
in absolute terms1 – less developed than the core. For 17th century Jesuit missionaries,
carrying on a Christian civilizational project, the Chinese were “peripheral” and in
need of enlightenment. However, the Chinese perceived themselves not only as highly
civilized, but in fact as central to the entire world and had certainly good reasons to do
                                                
1 Or rather: as seen by an external observer or a third, uninvolved party.
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so. Definition of the “peripheries” and the “core” is the basis of any such project and
often a source of many conflicts between the groups involved.
The core exercises influence upon its peripheries and perceives it has a right to do
it. The “right” does not mean only the ability to do so, for example by using force,
although such ability is of course necessary for a successful civilization project to exist.
The most important fact is that this influence is seen as beneficial for both of the
parties involved, but especially to the peripheries. The people of the centre believe their
actions are “for the best of all,” and not only for themselves. They believe they know
best, what is good for the peripheral people (often perceived as childlike and incapable
of proper reasoning) and act in their best interest, often at considerable expense on its
own side.
Members of the peripheral groups do not necessarily share this views and often
engage in various forms of opposition, from armed combat to different forms of
passive resistance. However, within the most successful civilizational projects, they are
usually persuaded to adopt the views of the centre and start to perceive themselves as
backward, unenlightened and uncivilized, which of course facilitates their acculturation
to the core civilization. Such a radical change of perception on the part of peripheries is
not an easy goal for the centre to attain. The simple subjugation by the force of arms
usually will not lead to such change: the conquered people may remain a rebellious
minority, attached to their beliefs and ways of life. The direct confrontation often leads
to solidification of identities, instead of acculturation and assimilation.
Therefore the civilizational project encompasses a wide range of actions of
persuasive character, of which education is probably the most important. Christian
missions offer a classical example: the founding of a school providing both religious
and non-religious education was usually the second most important part of the mission,
after the founding of a church, and more often than not, smaller missions combined the
prayer hall and the classroom under the same roof. The missions also show that
a civilizational project can be implemented on the territory not directly controlled by
the core group. They often operated in far-away2 places, among the people who barely
tolerated them, at high personal risk.
To better understand this concept, let us examine two civilization projects, which
were carried on in China: the Confucian one and the Communist one. The first one was
worked as the basis base of the Chinese empire from the Han dynasty until 1911. The
other was put into practice after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established
in 1949 and continues until today.
1.1 The Confucian civilizational project
For the Confucianists, the Confucian Culture was The Culture by a capital “c.” The
ideal was a gentleman well versed in Confucian classics, taught in private and public
schools of various levels, who, after passing a series of state-organized exams occupied
various public posts. The scholars-officials were the elite of the Chinese society and
were supposed to govern and give a good example of proper and moral conduct. The
                                                
2 Again “for them” and “from the centre” – the natives believed they are “close” and “at home.”
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system was ex definitione elitist and hierarchical, with the ruler at the top of the social
pyramid, and unenlightened masses of xiaoren (small people), at the bottom.
One of the most important features of the Confucian ethics was the fact that the
learning enabled man to progress and become more virtuous (the people had inborn
possibilities, but in order to truly develop their humanity, they needed a proper – i.e.
read “Confucian” – education; hence the developed school system). The idea was
mirrored in the political organization of the state, which placed the best scholars at the
top (and in the political centre). Less educated people were placed below; even lower
were the masses of Chinese people, who, although not educated in the Classics and not
schooled in rites and etiquette, generally followed they way of living of the elites (as
far as they were able to). They were settled agricurturalist, who prayed to the same
gods and conducted the same burial rites. At the extreme end were the barbarians, who
even if they lived within the borders of the empire, led completely different lives. The
most typical example of barbarians, at least infor the Chinese eyes, were the nomads of
the northeastern steppe, with their loose social organization and pastoral economy.
They were considered not only alien, but also ungovernable, since they knew nothing
about the proper duties of a man within a society. According to the Confucianists, they
could be only be ruled by force, which was antithetical to the proper way of
governance: the ruler should be “someone not fond of killing people” (Mencius in
Ebrey, 1993, p. 22).
Such a world-view placed the Han people3 in the social and political centre of the
empire and various other ethnic groups at the peripheries. They were classified as
shengfan or shufan (raw or cooked barbarians), according to the degree of their
acculturation to Chinese/Confucian ways (Harrison, 2001; Shepherd, 1993 both
describe well the ethnic situation of 18th and 19th century Taiwan, one of the most
troublesome borders of the empire) Multiculturalism and the idea of equality of
cultures was alien to this type of thinking.
One may question such strong identification of “the Chinese” and “the Confucian,”
since there were non-Chinese Confucian states and China itself was for long periods
governed by the ethnically different dynasties, like Mongolian or Manchurian. Many of
the noted Confucianists came from the borderlands of the empire, because once
somebody passed the the necessary exams and proved himself worthy, his ethnic
background was not longer important.
The non-Chinese origin of many rulers does not change the fact that due to their
speedy acculturation, their way of ruling adopted the ideas from Confucian classics –
and most of the Confucian books were written in various forms of Chinese languages
and described the ways of life of Sinitic people; that the predominant majority of
Confucianists were from the central, not border territories of the empire; and that
although the Confucian system did not block other people from joining the society it
shaped, but it demanded at least partial sinification. The founding of schools to teach
                                                
3 The wider use of the term “Hanzu” (“Han nation”) is quite recent and connected to modern Chinese
nationalism (often anti-Confucian in its origins). However, in the form of Han ren – Han people – it existed
for many centuries (Gladney, 1998). We can use “Han” to describe the people who built the Middle
Kingdom, if not for other reasons, then for the lack of a better term. They might not have thought of
themselves as Han, but then, they did not call themselves using the English word “Chinese,” either.
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the barbarians “proper ways” was seen as a very important part of stabilizing the
territory and consolidating the government (Shepherd, 1993).
1.2 The Communist project
The Communists, who have ruled mainland China since 1949, introduced their own
political vision and their own social stratification (which existed even in the periods of
the strongest “equalization”). For all their egalitarianism, the Chinese Communists had
similar view of the leading elites as the the Confucianists did, only the elites were to be
Marxist- not Confucian-educated. Communist Party and state cadres were supposed to
care for the people, to enlighten them and serve as model workers and leaders.
The Communist inherited the vast empire, inhabited by many groups of people,
whose cultures and ways of living varied enormously. The new rulers adhered to the
idea of equality of all nationalities (which was a part of their anti-imperialist stance).
To govern properly, they needed to know who are the people they were to govern,
therefore in the 1950s they carried an extensive program of ethnic identification (minzu
shibie),4 to identify all the groups, which split into a Han majority and 54 (later 55)
national minorities (shaoshu minzu).
Next, the groups were ranked according to five point scale of economic
development, corresponding to the five stages of history of classical Engels’ theory of
the social progress, based in turn on the evolutionary paradigm of Lewis Henry
Morgan (Harrell, 2001). Marxism is first of all an economical theory, so new
hierarchization was based on economical standards (believed to be universal). The
minorities were ranked as being at the slave, feudal or capitalist stage of development,
and appropriate policies were worked out for them, to raise them to standards of
socialist economy and society (in the period of the political turmoil of the 1950’ and
1960’ these separate policies were discarded and a general policy of forceful sinization
was implemented, which treated all local cultures as “backward,” without taking into
account their huge variety).
Although the base for scaling was different, the effect remained the same: the Hans
were at the top, this time not as the most culturally advanced (as it was under
Confucian empire), but as the most economically developed. Only one minority, the
Koreans, was ranked equally high. The remaining groups were ranked lower, some as
low as the “primitive” or “slave” stage. Basically, who once was barbarian, was likely
to still be a barbarian, only the name and rhetorhic used to refer to the respective group
was somewhat different. Such world-view did not help the Hans to overcoame their
deeply rooted prejudices, nor did it make them more willing to listen to the minorities’
opinions (Harrell, 1995). Most of the policies developed on the basis of this project are
essentially assimilationist, even if this is not their stated purpose (Heberer, 1989).
                                                
4 For some details of the process see, for example, Fei, 1990.
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2. The minority/ethnic discourse
The public and especially the political discourse is an important feature of political
life, revealing the state of the relationships between different social groups, political
parties and other bodies or between the government and the people. Critical discourse
analysts point out that the discourse is usually shaped by those who are in power: the
state, the wealthy, the strong religious or other organizations (Dijk, 1997). The media
discourse in China is especially interesting, because – thanks to the modern technology
– it is possible to observe it from outside of the country, which gives its researchers the
unique possibility of continuous study. Also, because the electronic media are now
multilingual, we can follow two versions of it: the one for internal consumption (in
Chinese) and the one presented to the world (translated into English), and observe
possible discrepancies.
The regulation of public discourse in China was always seen as state prerequisite.
The Confucianists spoke about rectification of names (zhengming), through which the
ruler decided on the proper usage of the words and actions connected to them. Such
regulation also encompassed the official interpretations of the Classics – this task was
delegated to the scholars of the Imperial Academy. The modern version of the state
control over public discourse has form of the widespread censorship, which the PRC
imposes on its media. The electronic media are especially well controlled, therefore
what we can read bears an official “stamp of approval.”
The response of the minority groups to the state policies, if it is not to be promptly
silenced or simply not voiced at all (because of the media auto-censorship), must be
kept well within the discoursive frames approved by the state. Any attempts to redefine
the terms of description have to be made slowly and cautiously. It should be pointed
out that voices of dissatisfaction or dissent are sometimes heard and there is a degree of
tolerance to them. However, the borders of such tolerance are not well defined and not
secured – for example by the enforced laws warranting freedom of speech.
The state – defined minority discourse in China has been described as “orientalistic,”
because it follows the pattern well described in the famous book “Orientalism” (Said,
1979), which showed how – especially in the 19th century – European authors and
scientists described the Eastern people as exotic “Others:” mysterious, hard to
understand, but at the same time attractive and fascinating and, repulsive and
unpredictable. Dru Gladney identified the same features in Chinese descriptions of the
minority people, including the not-described benchmark of “normality” (from which “the
Others” differ). In European Orientalistic discourse it was the Europeans, who functioned
as such benchmark. In the modern Chinese discourse, the Chinese majority serve in this
role (Gladney, 1994).
A brief look at some of the recent Chinese publications confirms Gladney’s
observations. The descriptions concentrate on peculiarities, which differentiate the
minorities from the Han majority. Sometimes these descriptions reveal more about
their author than the people described, just like the careful reading of Orientalists
depictions of the East tells more about them, thean about the Easterners. The passage
below is a good example:
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The Russian nationality is very particular about etiquette. [...] If you are to be the guest of
a Russian family, the first thing to remember is that you must knock on the door and before you
enter you must wipe your feet, sit where the host asks you to and never just come in and sit on the
bed. You must ask permission before smoking and be careful to put the ashes in the ash tray. If
you smoke a cigarette, you should be prepared to offer the whole pack to the host and his family
(Zhang and Zeng, 1993, p. 199).
Looking through the illustrations of such books (e.g. Xing, 2005), it is also easy to
notice how “exotic” and “feminine” the minorities are (treating peripheral people as
women is a part of a “sexual metaphor,” inherent to civilisation projects (Harrell,
1995). Photographs usually show young women, clad in colourful, if not gaudy,
costumes. Very often they engage in “traditional occupations” like weaving or sewing.
The men, whose dress is usually not so pretty, are less interesting, and besides, they
tend to discard traditional costumes much sooner than women. Presumably the readers
are not interested in seeing the people clothed the same way they do, so the authors
avoid taking such shots.
Among the most-depicted activities most frequently depicted are various forms of
merry-making:5 dancing, playing traditional instruments, singing (with special forms
like rhyming duets duly noted); great attention is paid to festivals. Religious beliefs,
especially those not shared by the Han majority (i.e. other than not Mahayana
Buddhism or taoism) are mentioned relatively often, which can be seen as another
mark of “otherness.” A characteristic feature of many Chinese scientific publications
about minorities cultures is the absence of the word “culture” itself. Instead of
“culture” (wenhua, which has strong, Confucian and Han Chinese overtones and is
associated with written culture), words like “fengsu xiguan” (folk customs) are used
even in monographic descriptions of the entire group cultures like in Yizu fengsu zhi
(The customs of the Yi) (Bamo, 1992). When written (wen) sources are analysed,
wenhua is used more often e.g. in Bimo Wenhua Lun (Zuo and Tao, 1993).
3. Confucianization of discourse
The weakening of the official Marxist ideology has created an ideological void in
China, which may become dangerous. Two possible ideologies are most likely to take
over this empty space: nationalism (especially in its state-promoted form) and some
form of reformulated Confucianism. The emergence of active (one may even say
“aggressive”) nationalism during thein last decades is obvious in China. Such
nationalism may appear dangerous, especially if the identity questions are not well
solved as is the case of nowadays’s China: the ethnic Han nationalism can dominate
the civic Chinese (encompassing also non-Han citizens of China) one. The possible
“clash of civilizations” in some minority regions, especially in Xinjiang, would be
possible outcome of such situation.
                                                
5 As we all know, it is the children who spend most of their time playing; and treating the peripheral
people as “childlike” is also typical for the civilization project.
Confucian values in China’s minority discourse and their possible importance...  143
The Confucianism appears to be a safer option: in the case of international relations
it provides a link with important China’s neighbours; in the case of internal policy,
being essentially a non-ethnic ideology,6 may bring about lessening of the ethnic
problems. Since it is, first of all, a political ideology, Confucianism is a useful tool for
the state, especially because it puts the state above the individual. At the same time it
has a softer side, which may help to overcome the acute crises of present day China,
like widening the income gap, social inequalities and lack of protection of the people
by the state.
Confucian doctrine emphasizes care for well-being of the people (which is why it
may be so useful now); reviving the doctrine of filial piety, never truly lost in China,
may help to solve the problem of caring for the elderly. At the same time it will
strengthen, not weaken, the position of the state and the role of the (ruling) elites.
Stressing (Confucian) harmony over (Marxist) class conflict now plays a similar role;
the latter, so important in Mao’s times, is certainly de-emphasized now.
With regard to the ethnopolitical problems, several others Confucian ideas should
be noted: the notion of Great Unity, useful in opposing the separatist (called “splittist”
in China) tendencies, especially on the part of Tibetans and Uighurs (or, even more,
Taiwanese, although they are not a national minority); loyalty to the ruler and love of
country; or even the filial piety, which on the surface is only a family value, but has in
fact always served as the model for the obedience and loyalty to the ruler, mentioned
above (Guo, 2003).
It is rather unlikely that the hierarchisation of groups based on the adherence to
Confucian values will be introduced again – the Confucianism is certainly not likely to
receive such strong official sanction. The “equality of nations,” so often stressed by the
PRC on the international forum, would be at odds with the “inequality of nationalities,”
if the latter was declared an official policy back home. The “Confucianisation” of the
minority discourse takes an ostensibly harmless form of describing the “unified nation
of fifty six nationalities” as the PRC is invariably called in any Chinese publication
dealing with the minority question, as the “family of nationalities.”
If in its original, 19th century European usage the expression “family of nations”
had a rather egalitarian meaning,7 the family concepts, so central to Confucian
ideology, are all hierarchical. Out of five main human relations, the three kinship
relations all presuppose subordination of one party to another: son is obedient to father,
wife to husband and younger brother to the elder one. It is unthinkable that the Han
Chinese would position themselves in the “younger brother” place, when they always
underline their higher level of development, which should grant them the dominating
position. It is rather the “feminine” minorities, who would play the part of the humble
wife. The term xiongdi minzu, “elder/younger brother nationalities” is used both in
Chinese press and Chinese scientific writing (e.g. in the Chinese title of the article by
(Zhou, 2004)). Such “Confucian” descriptions are in fact made to fit the nationalistic
discourse, strengthening the notion of China’s unity:
                                                
6 It was Han-created and Han-dominated, but, as noted previously, it remained open for other people.
7 It is worth noting, however, that these modern nations constituting the “family” considered themselves
as a kind of world elite.
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The official media used the same approach to present the ethnic minorities in China. They were
identified as “brother ethnicities” (xiongdi minzu), also “descendeants of the Yellow Emperor,”
even though these ethnic minorities never regarded the Yellow Emperor as their ancestor (Pan et
al., 2005).
It must be stressed that the dominating party is supposed to be benevolent and
caring. But the extent of this benevolence, in both a qualitative and a quantitative
sense, is fully decided by the donor, not by the recipient, who is rather supposed to
show loyalty and filial piety than question the actions undertaken by the “father” or the
“older brother.” To give a more practical example, the development of minority regions
is indisputable if one considers on transportation and communication links, educational
and health facilities (Mackerras, 2004). But what exactly is “development” means is
fully decided solely by the political, and Han Chinese – dominated centre and is
sometimes perceived as exploitation of already scarce local resources. Economic
changes, although statistically beneficial, are not distributed equally: e.g. modern
industry generates employment, but rather of skilled Hans. Liew (2004) notes that in
Xinjiang the state-sponsored development failed to promote national unity.
The developing of the “socialist” economy is not longer part of the PRC agenda:
“modern” and “advanced” one took its place. This change did not change the fact that
the people of the areas being developed have little to say in the matter. Herzfeld (2001)
described similar attitude of the international organizations, donors of economic help,
but also noted that questioning the simplistic and one-sided approach to the
“development” became now an important feature of relations the donors and the
recipients such help. In China such dialogue has not yet appeared: re-defining the
development means questioning the official state policy, and the state is inclined to
view it as potentially subversive activity.
On the positive side, the benevolence and humanity of the dominating party, if
implemented, certainly benefits the minorites. Although the PRC is often accused of
persecuting the religion practitioners, in case of minorities more lenient treatment and
even actions of the state against the publications found offensive, e.g. those of Chinese
Muslims found offensive, was noted. On the negative side, full control of the policy
and of the discourse is in the hands of the majority, which decides whom, and to what
extent, it will help, and whom and to what extent, it will punish (Gladney, 1999). The
line between “religious” and “political” activity is sometimes very thin. For an
interesting analysis of, how the state controls the discourse through the term usage, see
Dwyer (2005).
The main problem is that the ultimate control lies with the Party, which – unlike the
Chinese state – does not have pro-minority policies for itself. Minority members can
advance socially despite being non-Hans, and sometimes thanks to it, due to e.g.
special universities created for them. But they receive no such help, when they try to
advance within the Party structures: here the education and training is strongly unified.
Confucian values in China’s minority discourse and their possible importance...  145
Conclusions
Despite positive values of “care” and “benevolence,” introducing (or re-
introducing) some form of Confucianism into of minority discourse is not likely to
bring important changes to the minority people, as long as the state, and more
importantly – the Party – exercises full control over such discourse. With the strong
hierarchy and ranking of the groups of people still in place, all the changes must be
“top-down.” The “top” is occupied by the Hans, who, however sympathetic they might
be to the minority cause, usually lack the hands-on experience with minority work and
always – the experience of being a minority. Political elites fear the internal disorder
and disunity, including possible (although not very probable) separationism of
Tibetans, and Xinjiang’s Uighurs. Such fears are not likely to make them willing
listeners to the (“uneducated, backward, and underdeveloped”) minorities.
Without granting the minorities an “equal voice,” including the rights to redefine
the terms of the discourse, the real autonomy for the minorities is hardly possible (of
course many other changes would also be necessary, most importantly the
promulgation and execution of appropriate laws). Such autonomy could in turn prove
to be the way to solve to China’s problem with minorities’ dissent. The already very
strong economic ties with the minority regions and general, external control of the
territories (usually located in volatile border regions) would remain in place, but the the
minorities will of self-government and protection of their own cultures could also be
satisfied.
Bibliography
Bamo, Q. (ed.) (1992), Yizu fengsu zhi (The customs of the Yi), Beijing: Zhongyin Minzu Xueyuan
Chubanshe.
Dijk, T. A. v. (1997), The Study of Discourse, vol. 1, chp. 1, London: SAGE Publications, pp. 1–35.
Dwyer, A. M. (2005), The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political
Discourse, East-West Center Washington.
Ebrey, P. B. (ed.) (1993), Chinese civilization: A sourcebook, New York: The Free Press.
Fei, X. (1990). Ethnic Identification in China. Thai-Yunnan Project Newsletter, (11).
Gladney, D. (1994), “Representing Nationality in China: Refiguring Majority/Minority Identities,”
The Journal of Asian Studies, 53 (1), pp. 92–123.
Gladney, D. (1998), “Clashed Civilizations? Muslims and Chinese Identities in the PRC,” in:
D. Gladney (ed.), Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia,
Fiji, Turkey, and the United States. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Gladney, D. (1999), “The Salafiya Movements in Northwest China: Islamic Fundamentalism among
the Muslim Chinese?,” in: L. Manger (ed.), Muslim Diversity: Local Islam in Global Contexts,
Curzon Press, pp. 102–149.
Guo, Y. (2003), Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China, Routledge Studies on China in
Transition. Taylor & Francis Ltd.
Harrell, S. (1995), Cultural Encounters on Chinas’s Ethnic Frontiers, Seattle: University of
Washington Press.
Harrell, S. (2001), Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China, Seattle: University of Washington
Press.
Harrison, H. (2001), Inventing the Nation, London: Arnold.
 CONFUCIANISM AND THE GLOBAL WORLD146
Heberer, T. (1989), China and its National Minorities. Autonomy or Assimilation, New York: M.E.
Sharpe, Inc.
Herzfeld, M. (2001), Anthropology: Theoretical Practice in Culture and Society, Wiley-Blackwell.
Liew, L. H. (2004), “Reaching out to Taiwan, Keeping in Xinjiang: the Impact of Marketization and
Globalization on National Integration,” in: L. H. Liew i S. Wang (eds), Nationalism, Democracy
and National Integration in China, RoutledgeCurzon.
Mackerras, C. (2004), “China’s Minorities and National Integration,” in: L. H. Liew i S. Wang (eds),
Nationalism, Democracy and National Integration in China, RoutledgeCurzon.
Pan, Z., Lee, C.-C., Chan, J. M., and So, C. K. Y. (2005), “To Cheer for the Family-Nation: The
Construction of Chinese Nationalism in the Handover of Hong Kong,” URL: http://www.zeview.
com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=882&Itemid=412, retrieved on 2007-12-11.
Said, E. (1979), Orientalism. Vintage.
Shepherd, J. R. (1993), Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier 1600–1800,
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Xing Li et al. (2005), China’s Ethnic Minorities, Beijing: Foreign Language Press.
Zhang, W. and Zeng, Q. (1993), In Search of China’s Minorites, Beijing: New World Press.
Zhou, Q. (2004), “The Creation of Writing Systems and Nation Establishment,” in: M. Zhou
and S. Hongkai (eds), Language Policy in the People’s Republic of China, Springer Netherlands.
Zuo, Y. and Tao, X. (eds), Bimo wenhua lun (Collection of Articles on Bimo Culture), Kunming:
Yunnan Renmin Chubansche.
